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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW—PRESERVING DIGNITY: THE DUE PROCESS
RESTRICTION ON SHACKLING CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS SHOULD ALSO
APPLY TO NON-JURY PROCEEDINGS. UNITED STATES V. SANCHEZ-GOMEZ,
859 F.3D 649 (9TH CIR. 2017), VACATED, 138 S. CT. 1532 (2018).
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a decorated veteran, permanently disabled from combat injuries, visibly in distress from the pain caused by the chains around his feet.1
Imagine a woman cradling her fractured, handcuffed wrist, or a man with a
deep leg wound shackled in ankle chains.2 Consider a blind man with only
one arm freed from shackles to hold his cane, unable to navigate the courtroom without the assistance of two officers.3 Among these people are Rene
Sanchez-Gomez, Moises Patricio-Guzman, Jasmin Morales, and Mark Ring,
all of whom were convicted of nonviolent offenses and hardly posed a threat
of harm to those inside the courtroom due to their physical injuries and limitations.4 Nevertheless, the United States District Court for the Southern District of California overruled each of their requests to remove their shackles,
deferring to a policy that allows criminal defendants to appear in pretrial
proceedings in full five-point restraints5 without an individualized determination of necessity.6
The situation for these defendants is the same as that for many across
the country who, despite the lack of necessity for full five-point restraints,
must appear in shackles anyway. Some federal courts enforce blanket policies allowing shackling for all defendants appearing in non-jury proceedings
without an individualized determination of need.7 In 2017, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit departed from its sister circuits by
1. Brief for Respondents at 5–6, United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532
(2018) (No. 17-312).
2. Id. at 7.
3. Id.
4. United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1536 (2018).
5. Brief for Respondents, supra note 1, at 3. Full five-point restraints include handcuffs, a belly chain, and leg irons. See Fatma E. Marouf, The Unconstitutional Use of Restraints in Removal Proceedings, 67 BAYLOR L. REV. 214, 278 (2015).
6. Marouf, supra note 5, at 278.
7. See, e.g., United States v. LaFond, 783 F.3d 1216, 1225 (11th Cir. 2015); United
States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 278, 283 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Roderick, 215 F.3d 1313,
at *1 (1st Cir. 1998) (per curiam); United States v. Zuber, 118 F.3d 101, 103–04 (2d Cir.
1997); Plank v. Smydon, No. 13-C-1281, 2017 WL 1067770, at *7 (E.D. Wis. Mar. 21,
2017); Perry v. United States, No. 2:08-cv-911, 2010 WL 5931970, at *23 (S.D. Ohio Dec.
21, 2010).
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holding that the policy requiring most pretrial detainees to appear in court
wearing shackles is unconstitutional and instead requires an individualized
determination regarding whether shackling is appropriate.8 The Supreme
Court of the United States, however, vacated the Ninth Circuit’s decision,
declaring the issue moot because the defendants’ cases had already been
resolved.9 The Supreme Court left open the question of whether routine
shackling of criminal defendants in non-jury proceedings is unconstitutional.10 This note argues that the due process restriction on shackling criminal
defendants in jury trials should apply to non-jury proceedings because the
use of restraints diminishes the dignity of the proceedings, impairs the defendant’s ability to defend himself, and violates the notion that a defendant
is innocent until proved guilty, therefore requiring the same individualized
determination of the need to shackle a defendant that is used in jury trials.
Part II of this note provides an explanation of the historical rationale
for prohibiting the use of restraints in criminal jury trials.11 Part III describes
the contemporary justifications for extending this prohibition to pretrial and
sentencing proceedings as well as bench trials.12 Part IV provides a detailed
analysis of why due process requires an individualized determination of the
need to shackle a criminal defendant in non-jury proceedings.13 Parts V and
VI argue that state and federal courts should: (1) adopt the Ninth Circuit’s
reasoning in United States v. Sanchez-Gomez;14 (2) hold that shackling criminal defendants in non-jury proceedings violates due process; and (3) adopt a
policy that requires individualized determinations of necessity for the use of
shackles.15
II.

HISTORICAL RATIONALE BEHIND PROHIBITING THE USE OF
RESTRAINTS

The prohibition of the use of restraints in criminal jury trials is based
on strong historical foundations.16 This section will discuss the common law
origins for the prohibition of the use of restraints, which date back to the
eighteenth century.17 Next, it will explore early American courts’ rationale
8. United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649, 666 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated, 138 S.
Ct. 1532, 1542 (2018).
9. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. at 1542.
10. Id.
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. 859 F.3d 649 (9th Cir. 2017).
15. See infra Part V.
16. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 626 (2005) (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 317 (1769)).
17. See infra Section II.A.
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for this prohibition.18 Finally, this section will survey what modern American courts have held regarding the topic and analyze the courts’ reasoning.19
A.

Common Law Origins

The prohibition against shackling defendants in the guilt phase of the
trial has deep roots in the common law.20 Early commentators of English
law suggested that a defendant should not appear in court in shackles, stating that shackles would diminish a defendant’s manner of reason and might
constrain his ability to answer.21 The common law recognized that restraints
might “skew perceptions of the defendant’s character.”22 Additionally, early
commentary argued that a defendant should be treated with humanity and
gentleness, without fear or uneasiness before the court.23 Therefore, it said
that a defendant should not be presented in court in shackles unless some
danger of escape existed.24
B.

Early American Courts

From the late nineteenth century, American courts adhered to the English common law notions regarding the use of shackles in criminal proceedings.25 The earliest of these decisions, issued by the Supreme Court of Cali-

18. See infra Section II.B.
19. See infra Section II.C.
20. Deck, 544 U.S. at 626 (quoting 4 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 317 (1769)).
21. Id. at 639 (“[i]t [was] an abuse that prisoners be chained with irons, or put to any
pain before they be attained.”) (quoting 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 34 (1797) (alterations in original); id. at 626 (“A defendant ‘must be brought to the
bar without irons, or any manner of shackles or bonds; unless there be evident danger of an
escape.’”) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 317
(1769)); United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649, 662–63 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[E]very
person at the time of his arraignment . . . ought not to be brought to the bar in a contumelious
manner; as with his hands tied together, or any other mark of ignominy and reproach; nor
even with fetters on his feet, unless there be some danger of a rescous or escape.”) (quoting 2
WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 434 (John Curwood, 8th ed.
1824)) (alteration in original).
22. Marouf, supra note 5, at 224 (citing 2 HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 434 (8th ed.
1894)).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Parker v. Territory, 52 P. 361, 363 (Ariz. 1898); People v. Harrington, 42
Cal. 165, 167 (1871); Hauser v. People, 71 N.E. 416, 421–22 (Ill. 1904); Blair v. Commonwealth, 188 S.W. 390, 393 (Ky. 1916); State v. Kring, 64 Mo. 591, 592 (1877); State v.
McKay, 165 P.2d 389, 405–06 (Nev. 1946); State v. Roberts, 206 A.2d 200, 203 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1965); French v. State, 377 P.2d 501, 502–04 (Okla. Crim. App. 1962); State v.
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fornia in 1871, acknowledged that shackling imposes a physical burden on
the defendant that prejudices his ability to defend himself.26 Courts also reiterated the idea that a defendant’s mental faculties would be diminished if he
were required to defend himself in shackles.27 Early American treatises also
relied on common law jurisprudence, concluding that shackles should only
be used in extreme instances so that a defendant may have all advantages
available for his defense.28 The common law rationale relied on in early
American courts is the basis for modern justifications for the prohibition on
shackles in criminal jury trials used today.29
C.

Modern American Courts

In 1970 in Illinois v. Allen, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of the use of shackles for the first time. 30 At issue in the case was
whether the trial court infringed on the defendant’s right to be present in the
courtroom during his proceeding, even though he was particularly disruptive.31 Although the Court suggested that a trial court bind and gag a defendant to keep him present during proceedings as a solution for how a trial
court could deal with such a disruptive defendant, it expressed concern over
this practice, explaining that no defendant should be tried while shackled
“except as a last resort” because it might affect the jury’s feelings about the
defendant.32 Additionally, it cautioned that shackling a defendant might undermine the “dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings that the judge is
seeking to uphold” and the defendant’s “ability to communicate with his
counsel” when he is physically restrained.33 Ultimately, the Court held that a
trial judge may exercise discretion in determining whether to eject the defendant from the courtroom or shackle him to maintain decorum. 34
A few years later, the Court decided whether it was inherently prejudicial to require a defendant to appear in prison garb, a closely related issue to
the use of restraints.35 It held that “the constant reminder of the accused’s

Smith, 8 P. 343 (Or. 1883); Poe v. State, 78 Tenn. 673, 676–77 (1882); Rainey v. State, 20
Tex. App. 455, 472 (1886); State v. Williams, 50 P. 580, 581 (Wash. 1897).
26. Harrington, 42 Cal. at 167.
27. See, e.g., Roberts, 206 A.2d at 203; French, 377 P.2d at 502–04.
28. Marouf, supra note 5, at 224–25 (citing 1 BISHOP, NEW CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 955,
at 572–73 (4th ed. 1895)).
29. Id. at 225.
30. Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970).
31. Id. at 338, 343–44.
32. Id. at 344.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 502–06 (1976).
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condition . . . may affect a juror’s judgment.”36 In 1986, the Court, while
deciding whether the presence of uniformed officers in the courtroom violated due process, acknowledged again that shackling is inherently prejudicial in the presence of a jury.37 In light of these decisions, lower courts today
uniformly hold that a criminal defendant ought to be free of restraint during
a jury trial, unless a justifiable security interest exists.38
In Deck v. Missouri, the Supreme Court finally addressed in detail the
constitutionality of shackling criminal defendants in front of a jury.39 Deck,
who was convicted of murder and robbery, appeared at his sentencing hearing in leg irons, a belly chain, and handcuffs after the trial court overruled
his objections to the use of shackles.40 After being sentenced to death, Deck
appealed, claiming that the use of shackles without an individualized court
determination violated the Constitution.41 The Court held that the Constitution does not support the use of shackles during the guilt or penalty phase of
a jury trial unless it is justified by an interest, like courtroom security, specific to the defendant on trial.42 The Court identified three justifications for
prohibiting routine shackling: (1) the presumption that a defendant is innocent until proved guilty; (2) the right to counsel and participation in the defense; and (3) the dignity and decorum of judicial proceedings.43 Additionally, it found that the sight of a defendant in shackles is inherently prejudicial.44 As in Illinois v. Allen, the Court determined that the trial court can
order that a defendant be shackled, but any such order must be based on an
individualized determination of necessity prior to shackling a defendant.45

36. Id. at 504–05.
37. Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 568 (1986) (citing Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337
(1970).
38. See, e.g., United States v. LaFond, 783 F.3d 1216, 1225 (11th Cir. 2015); United
States v. Zuber, 118 F.3d 101, 103–04 (2d Cir. 1997); People v. Jackson, 1822–30, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 586, 588–94 (1993); State v. Tweedy, 594 A.2d 906, 914–15 (Conn. 1991); State v.
Crawford, 577 P.2d 1135, 1141–46 (Idaho 1978); People v. Brown, 358 N.E.2d 1362, 1363–
64 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977); Hill v. Commonwealth, 125 S.W.3d 221, 233–34 (Ky. 2004); Lovell
v. State, 702 A.2d 261, 268–72 (Md. 1997); State v. Shoen, 598 N.W.2d 370, 375–77 (Minn.
1999); State v. Herrick, 2004 MT 323, ¶¶ 4–19, 101 P.3d 755, 757–59 (2004); State v. Tolley, 226 S.E.2d 353, 365–69 (N.C. 1976); Myers v. State, 2000 Okla. Crim. App. 25, ¶ 46, 17
P.3d 1021, 1033; Cooks v. State, 844 S.W.2d 697, 722 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc);
State v. Turner, 23 P.3d 499, 504–05 (Wash. 2001) (en banc).
39. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 624 (2005).
40. Id. at 625.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 624.
43. Id. at 630–31.
44. Id. at 635.
45. Deck, 544 U.S. at 629, 633.
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Consequently, routine shackling is not permitted.46 The Court, however,
specifically declined to extend this right to non-jury proceedings.47
III.

MODERN JUSTIFICATION FOR EXTENDING THE PROHIBITION TO
NON-JURY PROCEEDINGS

Part III of this note will analyze the modern justifications courts use in
extending the prohibition against indiscriminate shackling to non-jury proceedings. First, it will discuss the three state courts that have extended the
prohibition and the courts’ reasoning.48 Next, it will explain the Ninth Circuit’s departure from its sister circuits by analyzing the court’s opinion in
United States v. Sanchez-Gomez.49 It will also describe the Supreme Court’s
reversal of the Ninth Circuit’s opinion.50
A.

State Courts’ Application to Non-Jury Proceedings

Some state courts have extended the prohibition on indiscriminate
shackling to non-jury proceedings such as arraignments, bench trials, and
sentencing hearings.51 The Supreme Court of California first applied the
prohibition to non-jury proceedings, citing the dignity of the defendant and
respect for the judicial system as reasons for its unconstitutionality.52 Over a
decade later, the Supreme Court of Illinois also held that restraints are unconstitutional in any proceeding because they hinder a defendant’s ability to
assist his counsel, contradict a presumption of innocence, and debase the
defendant and the proceedings.53 In 2012, the New York Court of Appeals
joined courts in Illinois and California in holding that indiscriminate use of
shackles is unconstitutional.54 The New York Court of Appeals, however,
cited an additional reason that the other courts had not discussed, finding
that shackles have an unconscious prejudicial effect, even if the proceeding
is only taking place before a judge.55 While other state courts have not is46. Id.
47. Id. at 626.
48. See infra Section III.A.
49. See infra Section III.B; 859 F.3d 649 (9th Cir. 2017).
50. See infra Section III.B.
51. People v. Best, 979 N.E.2d 1187, 1189 (N.Y. 2012); People v. Allen, 856 N.E.2d
349, 353 (Ill. 2006); People v. Fierro, 821 P.2d 1302, 1321–22 (Cal. 1991).
52. Fierro, 821 P.2d at 1321–22.
53. Allen, 856 N.E.2d at 53.
54. Best, 979 N.E.2d at 1189.
55. Id. at 1189 (“Nonetheless, judges are human, and the sight of a defendant in restraints may unconsciously influence even a judicial factfinder. Moreover, the psychological
impact on the defendant of being continually restrained at the order of the individual who will
ultimately determine his or her guilt should not be overlooked.”).
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sued such opinions, legal scholars urge courts to hold that indiscriminate use
of shackles is unconstitutional at least for special cases, such as those involving juveniles or illegal immigrants.56 Other state courts, however, have
yet to extend the prohibition on indiscriminate shackling to such cases.
B.

The Ninth Circuit’s Departure from Its Sister Circuits

Although a small number of state courts have held that the prohibition
against indiscriminate shackling applies to non-jury proceedings, by 2017,
every federal circuit court to decide the issue uniformly held that the prohibition against indiscriminate shackling did not apply to non-jury proceedings.57 In 2013, the United States District Court for the Southern District of
California adopted a policy allowing the United States Marshals Service to
“produce all in-custody defendants in full restraints for most non-jury proceedings.”58 On the first day of the policy’s implementation, the Federal
Defenders of San Diego objected to each use of restraints and requested that
each defendant’s shackles be removed, including those of Rene SanchezGomez, Moises Patricio-Guzman, Jasmin Isabel Morales, and Mark Ring. 59
The district judges routinely denied all the objections, and the four defendants consolidated their cases to appeal the decisions.60
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit departed from its sister circuits by holding
that the district court’s policy of indiscriminately shackling criminal defendants in non-jury proceedings is unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.61 It first justified its holding by reasoning that
the presumption of innocence until proved guilty did not support the use of
unwarranted restraints.62 Additionally, it held that the dignity of proceedings
cannot be upheld if defendants are routinely shackled.63 Because the court
recognized the right to be free from unnecessary shackles as a fundamental
56. Marouf, supra note 5, at 217 (asserting that “procedural due process requires an
individualized judicial determination of the need for restraints in removal proceedings based
on the same rationales underlying this prohibition in the criminal context.”); Anita Nabha,
Shuffling to Justice: Why Children Should Not Be Shackled in Court, 73 BROOK. L. REV.
1549, 1551–52 (2008) (arguing that “routine and indiscriminate use of shackles on juveniles
is contrary to the juvenile justice system” because the notions of fairness and justice are disrupted).
57. United States v. LaFond, 783 F.3d 1216, 1225 (11th Cir. 2015); United States v.
Davis, 754 F.3d 278, 283 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Roderick, 215 F.3d 1313 (1st Cir.
1998) (unpublished) (per curiam); United States v. Zuber, 118 F.3d 101, 103–04 (2d Cir.
1997).
58. United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649, 653 (9th Cir. 2017).
59. Id. at 654.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 661.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 662.
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right, it required that shackling be supported by a “compelling government
purpose.”64 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit departed from its sister circuits with
its unique take on the concepts of due process and dignity, illuminating the
issue at a national level.65
Five judges dissented, however, arguing that the case should not be
heard at all because the issue was moot.66 Nevertheless, the dissent asserted
that even if the appeals had not been moot, Supreme Court precedent dictated that the prohibition on the use of restraints did not apply in pretrial proceedings or proceedings before a judge.67 By creating a “blanket constitutional rule,” the dissent stated that the majority created an unnecessary circuit split and put federal courts at risk due to lower courtroom security.68
In February of 2018, the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion, agreeing with the dissent that the case was moot.69 By the time the
defendants’ appeal reached the Ninth Circuit, the underlying criminal cases
had come to an end.70 The Ninth Circuit, however, concluded that their
claims were not moot because the claims resembled a class-action, and due
to Supreme Court precedent on class action lawsuits, a live controversy remained although the defendants were no longer subject to the challenged
policy.71 The Supreme Court rejected this interpretation, stating that no
“freestanding exception to mootness outside the class action context” exists.72 It also rejected the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that because it was
“like” a class action, it could be heard as such.73 While the Court vacated the
64. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d at 661.
65. Constitutional Law—Substantive Due Process—Ninth Circuit Deems Unconstitutional Routine Shackling in Pretrial Proceedings, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1163, 1164, 1167
(2018).
66. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d at 666–69 (Ikuta, J., dissenting) (“Because Morales,
Sanchez-Gomez, Patricio-Guzman, and Ring have no ongoing interest in the purely prospective relief they seek, see Maj. op. at 657–58, their appeals are moot unless some exception to
the ordinary rules of mootness applies . . . The majority implicitly concedes as much by contriving a new exception—the “functional class action,” id. at 657–58—in order to rescue
these appeals from mootness. Because this theory is inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent and incompatible with Article III’s case-or-controversy requirement, the majority’s
creative effort to sidestep mootness should be rejected.”).
67. Id. at 677–78 (“Instead, Deck explained that the rule ‘was meant to protect defendants appearing at trial before a jury.’ . . . In other words, there is no rule regarding restraints
on pretrial detainees in non-jury proceedings that has ‘deep roots in the common law.’ . . .
The majority dismisses this conclusion as ‘undoubtedly dictum’ and ‘contradicted by the very
sources on which the Supreme Court relied.’ . . . These rationalizations do not hold water.”)
(quoting Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 626 (2005)).
68. Id. at 680, 683.
69. United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1542 (2018).
70. Id. at 1536.
71. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d at 659.
72. Sanchez-Gomez, 138 S. Ct. at 1538.
73. Id. at 1539 (“Courts may not . . . ‘create . . . class actions at will.’”).
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Ninth Circuit’s opinion, it acknowledged that those wishing to challenge the
use of physical restraints have other avenues of relief.74 Because the Court
held this particular case moot, it took no position on the issue, therefore
leaving the question open yet again.75
IV.

DUE PROCESS REQUIRES AN INDIVIDUALIZED DETERMINATION OF
NECESSITY

Under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause, no person shall be
“deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”76 The
Supreme Court has continually reiterated that freedom from restraint has
always been the “core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause
from arbitrary governmental action.”77 This freedom from restraint includes
freedom from shackles in the courtroom.78 When determining whether a
government action violates procedural due process, a court generally considers three factors.79 First, a court must consider the private interest that
will be affected by the official action.80 Second, it must evaluate the risk of
an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the procedures used, and
the probable value of any procedural safeguards.81 Third, a court must consider the government’s interest, including the function involved and any
burdens that the procedural safeguards would entail.82
A.

The Private Interest Affected

The Supreme Court has discussed three different ways that the use of
shackles in a jury trial disturbs a defendant’s interest in liberty.83 First, the
use of shackles might undermine the dignity of the proceedings.84 Second, a
defendant might be prevented from participating fully in his defense.85
Third, the presumption of innocence could be tainted with bias if the de74. Id. at 1542 (“None of this is to say that those who wish to challenge the use of full
physical restraints in the Southern District lack any avenue for relief. In the course of this
litigation the parties have touched upon several possible options. See, e.g., Tr. of Oral Arg.
12 (indicating circumstances under which detainees could bring civil suit).”).
75. Id.
76. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
77. United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649, 660 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 316 (1982)).
78. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 629 (2005).
79. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Deck, 544 U.S. at 630–31.
84. Id. at 630.
85. Id. at 631.
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fendant appears in shackles.86 Because these interests are similarly disturbed
when a defendant appears in shackles in non-jury proceedings, the same
analysis that applies to jury proceedings should also apply to non-jury proceedings.87
1.

The Interest in a Dignified Proceeding

The use of shackles in criminal proceedings undermines the dignity and
decorum of the courtroom.88 Regardless of the type of proceeding, a criminal defendant has an interest in the right to be treated with dignity and respect.89 In the words of Judge Richard Cardamone of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, “[t]he fact that the proceeding is
non-jury does not diminish the degradation a prisoner suffers when needlessly paraded about a courtroom, like a dancing bear on a lead, wearing
belly chains and manacles.”90 Additionally, a judge in the Seventh Circuit
likened a restrained defendant with the appearance of a “mad dog.”91 Not
only does the use of shackles diminish the dignity and respect of a defendant, it also affects the dignity and decorum of the courtroom.92 The dignity
of a courtroom reflects the gravity of the matter at issue and the potential
deprivation of an individual’s liberty through a criminal prosecution.93
Courtrooms are “palaces of justice, imbued with a majesty that reflects the
gravity of proceedings designed to deprive a person of liberty or even life.”94
The interest in a dignified proceeding will not prevail if defendants are
“marched like convicts on a gang chain.”95 The defendant and the court itself have interests in a dignified proceeding, and, therefore, indiscriminate
shackling cannot be permitted.96 A person, even if charged with a crime,
deserves to enter a courtroom with his “head held high” to preserve dignity.97

86. Id.
87. United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649, 661 (9th Cir. 2017).
88. Id. at 661, 666.
89. Id. at 666.
90. United States v. Zuber, 118 F.3d 101, 106 (2d Cir. 1997) (Cardamone, J., concurring).
91. Maus v. Baker, 747 F.3d 926, 927 (7th Cir. 2014). The effects of this breach of
dignity on a defendant are discussed in Part V.
92. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d at 662.
93. Id. (citing Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 631 (2005)).
94. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d at 662.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 666.
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The Interest in Participating in One’s Own Defense

Not only does a defendant have an interest in a dignified proceeding,
but also a constitutional right to present a full defense.98 Restraints can interfere with a defendant’s ability to participate in his own defense by impeding
his communication with counsel, impairing his mental faculties, and causing
physical pain.99 Historically, the idea that shackles affect a defendant’s mental faculties was a common belief.100 Early commentary opined that defendants should appear in court without shackles “so that their pain shall not take
away any manner of reason, nor them constrain to answer, but at their free
will.”101 Modern cases tend to follow the same reasoning. For example, the
Ninth Circuit recognized the physical and psychological impact shackles can
have on a defendant in Spain v. Rushen, which involved a defendant who
was restrained during his seventeen-month trial.102 In this case, the defendant expressed to the court that he could not concentrate as easily while restrained.103 The court acknowledged that the shackles consumed the defendant’s attention and impaired his ability to prepare his defense.104
While the idea that restraints negatively affect a defendant’s mental
faculties has been acknowledged for centuries, it is usually not supported by
evidence.105 Recent research into the field of “embodied cognition,” however, has confirmed this idea.106 This research examines the influence that a
person’s bodily state can have over his mental processes.107 In one study,
test subjects who were placed in constricted postures proved to be quicker to
develop a learned helplessness and perform lower on tasks involving abstract thinking.108 When constrictive posture is coupled with actual restraint,
the psychological impact on a person is even more severe.109 The common
restraints used in a courtroom, such as handcuffs and chains, are accompanied with distinct physical sensations that are permeated with symbolism. 110
Physically, defendants see, feel, and hear metal restraints from their hands to
98. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967).
99. United States v. Zuber, 118 F.3d 101, 106 (2d Cir. 1997) (Cardamone, J., concurring).
100. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 631 (2005).
101. Id. at 626 (quoting 3 EDWARD COKE, INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 34
(1797)).
102. Spain v. Rushen, 883 F.2d 712, 723 (9th Cir. 1989).
103. Id. at 722.
104. Id.
105. Marouf, supra note 5, at 258.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 259.
108. Id. at 260.
109. Id. at 261–62; Nabha, supra note 56, at 1577 (noting that shackles can “exacerbate
feelings of isolation and hopelessness.”).
110. Marouf, supra note 5, at 263.
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their feet.111 Mentally, metal restraints symbolize criminality, oppression,
submission, and powerlessness.112 When the physical effects are coupled
with the mental effects, the gravity of the impact that needless restraints
have on defendants, not yet proved to be guilty, is apparent. Additionally,
physical restraints can impair the defendant’s body language, movement
around the courtroom, and ability to take notes.113 A defendant can be affected by restraints in many ways, some of which might infringe on his constitutional right to freely participating in his defense.114
3.

The Interest in Maintaining the Presumption of Innocence

Some courts assume that judges are immune to the potential bias that
the sight of a defendant in shackles might present because they are “uniquely capable” of making an objective determination regardless of the presence
of irrelevant factors.115 The possibility that a decisionmaker might be prejudiced by the sight of a defendant in shackles does not dissipate when the
decisionmaker is a judge rather than a jury.116 In fact, a variety of studies
suggest that judges are overconfident regarding the fairness and accuracy of
their decisions, which in turn makes them increasingly susceptible to unconscious bias.117 Furthermore, judges are not immune because of their “representativeness” bias, a concept that legal scholars have developed referring to
how people might base their judgments regarding whether someone fits into
a specific category on how representative a person is of that category.118 In
2001, a study conducted with 167 federal magistrate judges discovered that
judges exhibit representativeness bias, among other forms of heuristic biases.119 The study found that even though judges exhibited representativeness
bias, they still scored higher than other professions on the test designed to
detect bias.120 While jurors might be impacted more by prejudice, this study
111. Id. at 263–64.
112. Id. at 264.
113. Brooksany Barrowes, Comment, The Permissibility of Shackling or Gagging Pro Se
Defendants, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 349, 364.
114. See supra Section II.A.
115. United States v. LaFond, 783 F.3d 1126, 1221 (11th Cir. 2015) (“. . . restraints
would ‘have no impact at all on [its] sentencing decision.’”) (alteration in original); United
States v. Zuber, 118 F.3d 101, 103 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1997) (“There is no jury or any other person here who is going to . . . be swayed. I am not swayed by the fact that he is or isn’t in
restraints.”); People v. Best, 979 N.E.2d 1187, 1189 (N.Y. App. 2012).
116. Best, 979 N.E.2d at 1189.
117. Marouf, supra note 5, at 269; Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59
UCLA L. REV. 1124, 1172–73 (2012).
118. Marouf, supra note 5, at 270.
119. Id. at 271–72.
120. Id.
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asserts that judges still might be susceptible to bias.121 Judges are human and
could be unconsciously influenced by the sight of a defendant in shackles.122
Ultimately, the impact of the use of shackles on judges substantially harms a
defendant’s interest in a fair and unbiased proceeding, which is an interest
that is not outweighed by the interest of the government.123
B.

The Government’s Interest

Next, a court must evaluate the government’s interest at stake.124 The
government’s interest in courtroom security must be balanced against a defendant’s liberty interests. The government has an interest in maintaining the
security and safety of those in the courtroom, especially because security
has become an increasingly important issue.125 Traditionally, the need for
security sometimes outweighed the right to be free from shackles.126 In Deck
v. Missouri, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution forbids the use of
visible shackles in the guilt and penalty phase unless the use is justified by
an essential state interest, like courtroom security.127 According to a 2012
article, the United States Marshals Service reported that judicial threat investigations at the federal level increased from 592 in fiscal year 2003 to
1,238 in fiscal year 2011.128 Additionally, the number of violent incidents in
state courts has increased every year since 1970.129 With security breaches
on the rise, the government certainly has an interest in maintaining courtroom security. The interest in security, however, can still be protected
through individualized determinations.130
Even if there is concern over courtroom security, the notion that indiscriminate shackling is the best way to maintain courtroom security is unfounded. In 2014, only 2.1% of all arrests for federal offenses were for violent offenses.131 Additionally, between 2001 and 2007, of all persons
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id.
People v. Best, 979 N.E.2d 1187, 1189 (N.Y. App. 2012).
Marouf, supra note 5, at 277.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
Marouf, supra note 5, at 245.
Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 626, 629 (2005) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 317 (1769)) (holding that a defendant should not
be shackled “unless there be evident danger of an escape.”).
127. Id. at 629.
128. Timm Fautsko, Steve Berson, & Steve Swenson, Courthouse Security Incidents
Trending Upward: The Challenges Facing State Courts Today, NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE
COURTS (2012), https://www.ncsc.org/sitecore/content/microsites/future-trends-2012/home/
better-courts/1-1-courthouse-security-incidents.aspx.
129. Id.
130. Marouf, supra note 5, at 246.
131. Mark Motivans, Federal Justice Statistics, 2014 – Statistical Tables, BUREAU OF
JUST. STAT. (2017), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs14st.pdf.
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charged with criminal offenses in federal courts, only 2% had previously
escaped from custody.132 While the government has an interest in maintaining security, evidence suggests that only a small fraction of criminal defendants pose a security risk.133 Therefore, the government’s interest in maintaining security is often outweighed by a defendant’s interest in being free from
indiscriminate shackles.
C.

The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation of the Private Interest
1.

The Government’s Interest in Security Does Not Justify the Deprivation of a Defendant’s Liberty Interests in Being Free from Indiscriminate Shackling

Under the Mathews test, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of private
interests by the procedures used must be examined, as well as any procedural safeguards.134 Because most defendants do not pose a safety or escape
risk, indiscriminate shackling poses a high risk of erroneous deprivation of
the private interests at stake.135 To illustrate, when the United States District
Court for the Southern District of California adopted the blanket policy of
shackling all defendants in nonjury proceedings, it cited “two serious incidents—an assault and a stabbing” that occurred in the district’s courtrooms.136 The district court deferred to the United States Marshals Service’s
request to adopt this policy because “more than 44,000” detainees had
moved through their custody in the previous year.137 These numbers, however, provide an incident-to-detainee ratio of less than .005%.138 Security
should not justify blanket deprivation of fundamental rights.139 Courts have
acknowledged that “a ‘once bitten, twice shy’ rationale” is inappropriate in
the context of shackling.140 A relatively small number of incidents of security breaches and disorder in the courtroom do not justify the use of indiscriminate shackling. Therefore, if special security risks are present, a court
132. Marie VanNostrand, Gena Keebler, & Luminosity Inc., Pretrial Risk Assessment in
the Federal Court, 73 FED. PROBATION (2009), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/
73_2_1_0.pdf.
133. Id.
134. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
135. See cases cited, supra notes 98–99.
136. Brief for National Ass’n of Federal Defenders as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 1, at 14.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Jones v. Edwards, 770 F.2d 739, 742 (8th Cir. 1985).
140. United States v. Baker, 432 F.3d 1189, 1245 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Davis v.
State, 195 S.W.3d 311, 314–16 (Tex. App. 2006) (holding that a judge erred when imposing
a shackling policy based on a violent incident that occurred in a courtroom in another state).
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should apply the same rationale used in jury trials in deciding whether to
shackle a defendant.141
2.

The Decision to Shackle a Defendant Should Be Made by a Court
Rather Than the Executive Branch to Avoid the Risk of Erroneously Depriving a Defendant of His Liberty Interests

The notion that the government’s interest in maintaining security allows a court to delegate its decision to those who maintain security, such as
the United States Marshals Service, fails the procedural due process test.142
If courts delegate the decision to shackle a defendant to individuals who
provide security, an erroneous deprivation of an individual’s liberty occurs.143 In Sanchez-Gomez, the Ninth Circuit rejected the idea that courtrooms can be maintained like prisons because of safety concerns.144 Traditionally, law enforcement officers have no authority over the treatment of
individuals appearing in a courtroom.145 The court emphasized that “law
enforcement officers have no business proposing policies for the treatment
of parties as a class.”146 Furthermore, if law enforcement officers, who could
be seen as adversarial, are the ones determining the need for shackling, an
inherent risk of error exists.147 Law enforcement officers have a motive to
restrain defendants to ease their burden of maintaining security.148 Courts
have described the decision to delegate the determination for need for restraints as an abuse of discretion rather than an exercise of discretion.149
Therefore, to avoid an erroneous deprivation of a defendant’s interests, it is
imperative that judges make the determination rather than deferring to law
enforcement.

141. Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 633 (2005) (“Any [shackling] determination must
be case specific; that is to say, it should reflect particular concerns, say, special security needs
or escape risks, related to the defendant on trial.”).
142. United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649, 666 (9th Cir. 2017).
143. Id.
144. Id. at 665.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Marouf, supra note 5, at 251.
148. Id.
149. Davidson v. Riley, 44 F.3d 1118, 1125 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Hameed v. Mann, 57
F.3d 217, 222 (2d Cir. 1995); Lemons v. Skidmore, 985 F.2d 354, 356 (7th Cir. 1993) (A
judge “abused his discretion by relying on the self-serving opinion of fellow penal officers of
the defendants and not holding a hearing to determine what, if any, restraints were necessary.”).
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RECOMMENDATIONS

Courts should adopt the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in United States v.
Sanchez-Gomez and hold that the indiscriminate shackling of criminal defendants violates due process.150 In Sanchez-Gomez, the Ninth Circuit began
its reasoning by emphasizing the fundamental right to be free from unwarranted restraints.151 The court then clarified the scope of that right by explaining the need for dignity and the need for a defendant to have the full
capability to defend himself.152 The Ninth Circuit rejected the Supreme
Court’s idea that the common law drew a distinction between trial and pretrial proceedings when applying the right.153 Finally, the court criticized the
notion that a court should delegate the decision of whether to shackle a defendant to law enforcement.154 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit found the policy
of indiscriminate shackling unconstitutional, and courts should adopt its
reasoning and hold the same.155
Second, courts should adopt a detailed policy requiring an individualized determination of the need for the use of shackles in non-jury proceedings. Judges currently have the discretion to decide whether to shackle a
defendant based on the circumstances of each case.156 While trial judges
enjoy this discretion, implementing standard practices in evaluating whether
to shackle a defendant would promote uniformity, efficiency, and fairness in
the process of making these individualized determinations.157 In the interest
of efficiency, there need not be a hearing for every defendant, but courts
should still make an individualized decision as a matter of record regarding
the need for shackles.158 Some courts make determinations ahead of the daily court schedule through a review of the defendant’s background and a recommendation from the United States Marshals Service.159 Upon making the

150. See Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d at 666.
151. Id. at 660.
152. Id. at 661–62.
153. Id. at 663–64 (“The Supreme Court’s dictum on pretrial proceedings in Deck doesn’t
control this case because it’s contradicted by the very sources on which the Supreme Court
relied.”).
154. Id. at 665.
155. Id. at 666.
156. Barrowes, supra note 113, at 369.
157. Id.
158. Jacqueline A. Connor, Security Concerns in the Courtroom, DAILY J.,
https://www.dailyjournal.com/mcle/132-security-concerns-in-the-courtroom (last visited
Sept. 1, 2019).
159. Maxine Bernstein, Judges Now Deciding Daily If Inmates Should Wear Shackles in
Court, THE OREGONIAN (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.oregonlive.com/portland/index.ssf/2017/
10/judges_now_deciding_daily_if_i.html.
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determination, defense attorneys will have the opportunity to object to the
decision before the defendants are brought into the courtroom.160
An example of a successful protocol is the District of Arizona’s protocol for the application of individualized discretion to shackling determinations.161 According to the protocol, before a detainee’s first hearing, the presiding judge should make an individualized determination of the need for
restraints by assessing all available information, such as charging documents, pretrial services reports, criminal history, and notations in the Marshals Service detainee database.162 The Marshals Service then inputs the
judge’s determination into its detainee database.163 During the first hearing,
the judge notes his determination and allows for its review.164 If the judge
ever modifies the restraint level, the Marshals Service will adjust the level in
the detainee database and produce the defendant in the modified restraint
level at future hearings.165 This protocol has proved to be successful for the
District of Arizona as it has had no incidents of violence since it became
effective in August of 2017.166 While a court’s protocol need not be identical
to this one, an assessment of similar information and following a similar
process will ensure that a court enacts a successful, efficient protocol to
make individualized determinations of the need for shackles.
VI. CONCLUSION
For hundreds of years, the notion of the right to be free from unnecessary restraint has been fundamental to individual liberty. 167 Courts are reluctant, however, to explicitly extend this right to defendants in non-jury proceedings.168 The Ninth Circuit attempted to become the first federal court to
extend the right to defendants in non-jury proceedings, but the Supreme
Court vacated the decision for other reasons.169 By understanding the historical and modern rationales for prohibiting the indiscriminate use of shackles,
however, it can be understood that this right is not only of the utmost importance in jury proceedings, but other types of proceedings as well. A thorough due process analysis proves that the indiscriminate use of shackling
160. Id.
161. Brief for National Ass’n of Federal Defenders as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 1, at 17.
162. Id. at 17–18.
163. Id. at 18.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See supra Part II.
168. See supra Part II.
169. United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 859 F.3d 649, 666 (9th Cir. 2017), vacated, 138 S.
Ct. 1532, 1542 (2018).
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impermissibly infringes on a defendant’s interest to be free from bodily restraint.170 Additionally, the use of restraints without need negatively affects a
defendant and impairs a judge’s ability to be objective.171 Therefore, courts
should adopt the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in United States v. SanchezGomez and hold that the indiscriminate use of shackling criminal defendants
in non-jury proceedings violates due process, thereby requiring an individualized determination of the need for shackles in each case.
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